

The Roots of Rebellion

I: INSURGENT BOLIVIA



Amid a sea of *wiphalas* (the rainbow-checked Aymara flag), demonstrators rallied in La Paz October 21 just days after having forced the resignation of then-President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.

by Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson

THE GREAT ANTI-COLONIAL INDIGENOUS insurrection of 1781 has haunted republican Bolivia since its founding in 1825. From their military encampment in El Alto overlooking the colonial city of La Paz, Aymara leaders Túpaj Katari and Bartolina Sisa laid siege to the ruling Spanish elite from March to October 1781. Lacking urban allies, they were ultimately unable to seize the city, yet the aspirations of that uprising have taken on new life at the beginning of the 21st century.

In October 2003, popular classes of Aymara descent living in El Alto spearheaded what became a broad-based movement to overthrow the increasingly repressive and illegitimate regime of then-President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. They too laid siege to the capital and brought it to a virtual standstill. Unlike Katari and Sisa, the latest insurgents successfully overtook the urban center, occupying all but a few blocks around Plaza Murillo where the Presidential Palace is located. Waving the Aymara flag (the *wiphala*) and the Bolivian flag side by side, the crowds swelled to as many as

500,000 on October 17, the day a heavily guarded Sánchez de Lozada fled to Miami. The stunning turn of events—dubbed by journalists the “gas war”—brought to an end the era of neoliberal domination in the country. It also confirmed that Bolivia has entered a new revolutionary moment in which indigenous actors have acquired the leading role. It is a time of great promise, but one whose outcome remains unforeseeable.

A powerful tradition of popular urban mobilization has been evident in earlier historical moments, as when “national-popular” forces overthrew the dictatorship of Col. Alberto Natusch Busch in 1979 or brought the Democratic Popular Unity (UDP) government to power in 1982. Yet the profile and organization of these previous mobilizations were different. In the 1970s and 1980s, workers, students and members of the progressive middle classes organized themselves through left parties and the national Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (COB). The politically emergent indigenous peasantry mobilized as well during this period,

*Forrest Hylton is a PhD candidate in history at New York University. Sinclair Thomson teaches Latin American history at NYU and is author of *We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency* (University of Wisconsin, 2003). They are coeditors of *Ya es otro tiempo el presente: Cuatro momentos de insurgencia indígena* (La Paz, 2003).*

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but almost entirely at the behest of the COB and as a junior partner in the national-popular bloc.

However, in October 2003 the progressive middle classes stirred only belatedly and the COB was a relatively minor player. More importantly, these groups were essentially backing demands previously launched by Aymara insurgents, organized mainly through their community, union and neighborhood organizations. Ultimately, though, all sectors converged around the same demands: the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada and his ministers, a trial to punish those responsible for state violence against the unarmed civilian population, a national referendum on how to develop the country's natural gas reserves, the formulation of a new Hydrocarbons Law and the convening of a Constitutional Assembly.

In contrast to the proletarian character of the national-popular struggles that ended the phase of military and narco-dictatorships in the early 1980s, the powerful movement in 2003 displayed an indigenous centrality in synch with the current demographic, sociocultural and political realities of Bolivia, where 62% of the population claims indigenous identity, according to the 2001 census.

If we are to understand the October insurrection, however, it is not enough to point out Aymaras' currently assertive historical agency. We must first note that the keen sense of Aymara identity is itself a product of recent political struggle, and that the entire context for the revolutionary cycle that opened in 2000 has been shaped by forceful and fluid processes of ethnic formation. The galvanization of indigenous identity is especially striking among the subaltern actors of October's events.

Members of mobilized rural communities on the *altiplano* (highland plateau) have gradually adopted a self-conscious cultural and political identity as "Aymaras" since the late 1970s. The rise of militant peasant unionism and the emergence of radical indigenous leaders criticizing ongoing forms of colonial hierarchy and racism within the country are largely responsible for this ethnic affirmation.¹ The trajectory of Aymara leader Felipe Quispe—known as "El Mallku," an Aymara term meaning both condor and traditional authority—reflects this process.

One of the most arresting features of the 2003 uprising was the expression of Aymara ethnic identity and solidarity among the urban residents—especially young protesters—of El Alto, an impoverished yet dynamic city of 900,000 outside La Paz. According to the 2001 census, 82% of *alteños*, as the city's residents are known, identify as indigenous. In La Paz, laborers from the hillside neighborhoods of Munaypata and Villa Victoria, a proletarian stronghold during the Revolution of 1952, actively sup-

ported the insurgent *alteños*. Although not all these neighborhood residents would overtly identify themselves as Aymaras, they share with *alteños* a history of multi-generational migration from the Aymara countryside and insertion into the ethnically segmented urban social hierarchy.

Bolivian miners have traditionally identified and organized themselves on a class basis. When mineworkers traveled from the mining center of Huanuni to join the protests in El Alto, they revived the memory and symbolic power of earlier proletarian struggle in the national-popular tradition. However, on this occasion they also surprisingly affirmed their own indigenous roots.

Cocaleros (coca growers), another important sector in the contemporary popular movement, and agrarian colonizers from the Yungas recognize their own Aymara origins, although their collective identity is more closely tied to grassroots union organizations than to the traditional Andean community, or *ayllu*. In the Chapare, the country's principal coca-growing region, the majority of residents are from the Quechua-speaking regions of the Cochabamba valleys. Others, like *cocalero* leader Evo Morales, are Aymara migrants from the highlands or Quechua-speaking former miners.

The *regantes* (small-scale coordinators of regional water distribution) who are best known for their role in the 2000 "water war" in Cochabamba also played their part in the "gas war." They have their roots in the region's Quechua-speaking mestizo peasant culture. Other actors in the uprising, like the peasant communities from Potosí and Chuquisaca, are organized through *ayllus* and are of mixed Quechua-Aymara background. All of these groups contributed to the insurgent movement that expressed itself so boldly, and with such a strongly indigenous accent, in 2003.

The point to emphasize, however, is that the insurrectionary energy of the 2003 uprising stemmed initially from the Aymara heartland of Omasuyos, on the altiplano around Lake Titicaca, and later from the Aymara city of El Alto. Likewise, indigenous communities and neighborhoods were the first to put forth the basic demands around which so many others eventually converged in October.

Historically, indigenous movements have sought to build ties with other popular and middle class opposition forces in cities and mining districts. Such tentative efforts took place during the indigenous mobilizations against Spanish rule in 1780-1781, the insurgent federalist movement led by Pablo Zárate Villca in 1899, the regional revolutionary movement led by Manuel Michel in 1927, the uprisings that began in Ayopaya in 1946 and the general strike of 1979. But relations between indigenous

movements and their potential national-popular allies have generally been marred by mutual suspicion, misunderstanding or plain racism.

Political theorist René Zavaleta Mercado pioneered the idea of “national-popular” forces in Bolivian history. Zavaleta posited that the insurrectionary “multitude” opposing oligarchic elites and their foreign, imperialist allies was formed through the political unification of normally divided subaltern subjects.² National-popular struggles of this sort can conceivably be traced back to the wars of independence against Spain. The active consolidation of this mode of struggle on the national political stage, how-

ever, began during the Chaco War (1932-1935) and culminated in the Revolution of 1952.

cycle was ushered in with indigenous protests on the altiplano and the water war in the Cochabamba valley. Finally, the events of October 2003 revived the tradition of Aymara community insurrection in one of Latin America's largest indigenous cities. The latest insurgency constitutes a major challenge to Bolivian society's internal colonialism and may lead to the formation of a new national-popular bloc representing the social majority.

THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION, SYMBOLIZED BY the overthrow of oligarchic rule in 1952, seemed definitively vanquished by neoliberal ideology as structural adjustment reached its apogee during Sánchez de Lozada's first term (1993-1997). The regime set out to privatize state tin mines and to “relocate” mining families to the outskirts of Oruro, Cochabamba, El Alto and the lowland frontiers of the Chapare. The union movement, which the government deemed an outmoded corporatist institution, came under relentless attack. Technocrats, ideologues and mainstream party functionaries—former middle class dissidents prominent among them—recited neoliberal mantras: competitiveness, governability, efficiency, deregulation, decentralization, direct foreign investment. Globalization, they argued, afforded unprecedented opportunities for indigenous peoples to reap the benefits of modern capitalist democracy.

Though economic growth was sluggish and state revenues plummeted as a result of privatization, the discourse of neoliberalism appeared hegemonic. During Sánchez de Lozada's first administration, international financial institutions signaled Bolivia as a model of “reform” and democratization for other developing countries. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, an architect of Bolivia's free market “shock treatment” in 1985, hailed Sánchez de Lozada as one of the most creative politicians of the era. The southern Andean nation became a shining star in the neoliberal firmament, and its militant popular movements appeared to have suffered a historic defeat.

As part of the wave of privatizations, Sánchez de Lozada drafted a Hydrocarbons Law in 1996 that dismantled YPF, the state energy firm, setting the stage for the transnational takeover of Bolivia's rich oil and natural gas resources. A year later, just two days before the end of his first term, he signed another decree effectively forfeiting constitutional sovereignty over the reserves. An official report released by the Bolivian government in December 2003 revealed that the Bolivia-based operations of British-owned BP Amoco and Spain's Repsol YPF enjoy the lowest operating costs for oil and gas production and exploration in the world.



A workers' march on May Day 2004 in La Paz; the sign reads "The gas for Bolivia."

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National-popular struggles were behind the nationalization of Gulf Oil under Gen. Alfredo Ovando Candia in 1969, the Popular Assembly government of Gen. Juan José Torres in 1971, as well as the overthrow of the Col. Alberto Natusch Busch and Gen. Luis García Meza dictatorships and the rise to power of the center-left UDP between 1979 and 1982. Throughout this period the left and the union movement held, at best, a condescending view of indigenous participation in national political organization. These groups privileged a schematic vision of class consciousness over cultural identity as the basis for political action. They also shared with elites a “whitening” ideology of national progress through mestizaje.

More recently, however, this began to change. The political fortunes of the left and the COB went into decline with the onset of neoliberalism in 1985, but indigenous political and cultural organization gained increasing momentum in the 1980s and 1990s. During this same period, coca producers acquired a strategically crucial political importance through their opposition to U.S. militarized drug intervention. Then in 2000, a new revolutionary

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The sweetheart arrangement for these oil corporations was an eerie—and not unnoticed—repetition of the oligarchy's sell-off of Bolivia's mineral reserves to Anglo-Chilean capital following the War of the Pacific in the late 1800s. Bolivians have had a long and bitter experience with the expropriation of their mineral wealth for the benefit of oligarchs connected to foreign capital. The monetary system in early modern Europe thrived on the export of Bolivian silver from Potosí, now one of the country's poorest, most desolate regions. In the 19th and 20th centuries, tin extracted from the area near Oruro was smelted in the



Women belonging to the Federation of Neighborhood Associations (FEJUVE) of El Alto march in Villa Ingenio, one of the city's most politically mobilized neighborhoods.

U.S. and Britain. Today, the working conditions and technology in most of Potosí's mines recall those of the colonial era, while Oruro is a landscape of post-industrial devastation where residents make superhuman efforts to survive. The protestors in the gas war were unwilling to see the old pattern repeated with natural gas since, according to many, only sovereign control over Bolivia's gas reserves—the second-largest in Latin America—could underpin a viable political and economic future for later generations.

A deal to export gas through a Chilean port to California was negotiated between San Diego-based Semptra Energy and the Spanish-British-U.S. energy consortium Pacific LNG under the watch of one-time dictator and then-President Hugo Bánzer. During his administration (1997-2001), Bolivia ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. With state violence and social protest on the rise, and the legitimacy of neoliberal political parties eroded, Sánchez de Lozada narrowly won the 2002 elections. His attempt to close the gas deal in 2003 sparked massive opposition to which he responded with blunt force. On September 20, the day after some 500,000 people marched throughout the country to defend national economic sovereignty, security forces killed three civilians in Warisata and one in Ilayata as part of an effort to "liberate" a group of tourists stranded by a road blockade. The center of conflict spread to El Alto on October 8 when the

Federation of Neighborhood Associations (FEJUVE) and the Regional Workers' Federation (COR-El Alto) declared a general strike. Members of the insurgent communities of Warisata and Achacachi, like their kinfolk in the alteño neighborhood of Villa Ingenio, conceived of themselves as patriots and their rulers as traitors to the Bolivian nation.

Once the massacres began, first in the countryside and then in the city, the relatives and friends of the deceased dubbed their dead "martyrs fallen in the defense of gas." The repression intensified and 31 died on October 12, the anniversary of Columbus' incursion into the Caribbean. Simultaneously, urban Aymara insurgents and their allies in the neighborhood of relocated miners known as Santiago II began to develop autonomous institutions for self-government similar to those developed in Warisata after September 20. More than 150,000 people marched from El Alto to downtown La Paz on October 13. After several days of mourning, and once the insurgent communities from Omasuyos arrived, rebels set out to overrun the capital. Prominent middle class personalities and politicians organized hunger strikes on October 15 that spread with remarkable speed to every major city in the republic. But by that point what had once seemed impossible had already become likely: Sánchez de Lozada—also known as "El gringo" because of his heavily accented Spanish (he was raised in the United States)—would have to go.

IN RETROSPECT, THE IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY OF THE Washington Consensus, embodied in Bolivia by Sánchez de Lozada, appears to have been a mirage. Contrary to neoliberal common sense, Bolivia's revolutionary past was not obliterated after 1985, but rather reconfigured. Contemporary indigenous radicalism grows out of a long, largely underground history, yet its irradiating effects since 2000 have reanimated aspirations for social and political change, harkening back to earlier moments of interethnic, interregional and cross-class alliance.³

The October insurrection thus represents an exceptionally deep and powerful, though not unprecedented, convergence between two traditions of struggle—indigenous and national-popular. Earlier mobilizations, and some of their gains—notably the nationalization of mines in 1952 or petroleum in 1969—left a more enduring legacy than had been supposed. Self-consciously building on earlier revolutionary cycles, especially those of 1780-1781, 1899 and 1952, the current cycle of 2000-2003 will leave its own legacy. The upcoming Constitutional Assembly, demanded by indigenous peoples since 2000 and secured by the revolutionary intervention of popular forces, offers

the most immediate possibility for social reform, or even national transformation.

The Assembly could help redraw state-society relations to reflect Bolivia's new historical conditions. It could recognize the enduring non-liberal forms of collective political, economic and territorial association by which most rural and urban Bolivians organize their lives. It could democratize the political relations that throughout the republican era have limited the participation of indigenous peoples in national political life, forcing them to resort to costly insurrectionary struggles. It could also redirect the future exploitation of the country's coveted resources in a way that benefits most Bolivians.

Political and economic elites will undoubtedly attempt to divert the current process. However, as long as they have no alternative agenda to offer, their attempts to stonewall the process are likely to only further radicalize

the opposition. These elites may try to construct a more visionary new hegemonic project but there are no signs of this as yet.

Meanwhile, popular sectors are engaged in effervescent debate and are formulating their own visions of the future. What would Bolivia look like with sovereign control over its territory and natural resources, with forms of regional and ethnic self-determination, with meaningful national political representation for popular movements or with true majority rule? Whatever the future brings, there will be no going backwards. The current conjuncture in Bolivia is marked by seasoned political skepticism, yet also measured hope, and it may well carry implications for other struggles in the Andes and Latin America more broadly. As indigenous insurgents of previous centuries proclaimed in moments of anti-colonial and autonomist insurrection: "*Ya es otro tiempo el presente*" ("The present is a new time"). ■

II. Reclaiming the Nation

by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ALLOWS THE Bolivian government only the minimal amount of wiggle room required to keep the masses at bay: a shred of maneuverability to neutralize the demands of the indigenous and working population. But Washington's serious miscalculations created an explosive situation in which the government in La Paz is hostage to contradictory policies that the country's social movements constantly challenge. The result is an unprecedented crisis of the Bolivian state, which has effectively lost its legitimacy and territorial control. Consequently, political spaces have emerged that are organized, maintained and occupied outside the dominant state system.¹ Indeed, since 2000 indigenous and popular uprisings have completely changed the face of Bolivia's political system.

The crisis of the state in Bolivia has actually been incubating for quite some time, but it only received international attention with the upris-

ings of February and October 2003, or perhaps earlier with the "water war" of Cochabamba in April 2000. After decades of invisibility and silence, our country again astonished the world with the vigor and radical nature of its popular mobilizations, which were surely seen from abroad as spasmodic, irrational convulsions, product of an accumulated, latent discontent.² In reality, however, they were remarkably coherent expressions of a collective consciousness with deep historical roots, announcing an alternative vision for Bolivian society. Bolivians have periodically asserted similar alternate national visions in the past at critical junctures when the exclusionary state has fallen into crisis.

Indeed, there are strong threads connecting recent episodes of social mobilization to the period of social turbulence that produced the "State of '52." Many of the same social actors, propelled by the same history, traditions and grievances, have arisen again now, and their upsurge stems

Aymara sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui is professor emerita at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz. She is a founding member of the Andean Oral History Workshop (THOA) and the author of several books. Translated from the Spanish by Teo Ballvé.

NOTES

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1. See Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, "Aymara Past, Aymara Future," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. 25, No. 3, December 1991, pp. 18-23; and Rivera's article in this issue.
2. See René Zavaleta Mercado, *Las masas en noviembre* (La Paz: Juventud, 1983), *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1986); and Luis Tapia's, *La producción del conocimiento local: historia y política en la obra de René Zavaleta* (La Paz: Muela del Diablo, 2002).
3. See Rivera, this volume; Forrest Hylton, Felix Patzi, Sergio Serulnikov, and Sinclair Thomson, *Ya es otro tiempo el presente. Cuatro momentos de insurgencia indígena* (La Paz: Muela del Diablo, 2003).

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1. See Pablo Mamani Ramírez, *El rugir de las multitudes. La fuerza de los levantamientos indígenas en Bolivia-Qullasuyu* (La Paz: Aruwiyiri y Yachaywasi, 2004). Also, Félix Patzi Paco, *Sistema comunal. Una propuesta alternativa al sistema liberal* (La Paz: Comunidad de Estudios Alternativos, 2004).
2. Edward P. Thompson, "La economía 'moral' de la multitud en la Inglaterra del siglo XVII," en *Tradición, revuelta y conciencia de clase: Estudios sobre la crisis de la sociedad pre-industrial* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1979), pp. 62-134.
3. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos. Luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa, 1900-1980* (La Paz: Aruwiyiri y Yachaywasi, 1984 and 2003).
4. See Mamani Ramírez, *El rugir de las multitudes*.
5. Sergio Almaráz, *Réquiem para una república* (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, 1969).
6. Partha Chatterjee, Lecture No.1 in *Our Modernity* (Rotterdam and Senegal: SEPHIS-CODESRIA, 1997).
7. Eduardo L. Nina Qhispi, De los títulos de composición de la corona de España. Composición a título de usufructo como se entiende la exención revisitaria. Venta y composición de tierras de origen con la corona de España. Títulos de las comunidades de la república. Renovación de Bolivia. Años 1536, 1617, 1777, 1825 y 1925. La Paz, ed.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEOLIBERAL REFORM

1. Katherine Ledebur, "Popular Protest Brings Down Government," *WOLA Special Update*, November 2003 <http://www.wola.org/publications/ddhr_bolivia_memo_nov2003.pdf>.
2. S. Escobar and I. Montero, *La industria en su laberinto* (La Paz: CEDLA, 2003).
3. In Bolivia's industry, 60% of added value is in manufacturing versus 37% in intermediate goods and 2% in capital goods.
4. Escobar and Montero, *La industria en su laberinto*, p. 374.
5. Ministerio de Agricultura, *Ganadería y desarrollo local, Diagnóstico nacional agropecuario* (La Paz, 2000).
6. Various government acts exacerbated the situation. In effect, of 44 million hectares distributed from 1953 to 1993 large and medium landowners, representing 28% of total recipients, received 48% of the area handed out. Only 52% of the land went to smallholders, though they represented 72% of total recipients. The process of "rectification" of land titles (*saneamiento*) prescribed by the 1996 Agrarian Reform Institute Law (*Ley INRA*) has not advanced adequately and, on the contrary, has allowed the privatization of land to proceed apace.
7. M. Pérez, B. Marcillo, and C. Alborta, *Escenarios virtuales y reales del sector agropecuario y rural del altiplano boliviano* (La Paz: CEDLA, 2001).
8. M. Pérez, *¿El último capítulo? Posibles impactos del ALCA en las comunidades campesinas e indígenas de Bolivia* (La Paz: CEDLA, 2004).
9. According to a 2000 study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), based on Argentine census data between 1980 and 1991 the number of Bolivian residents in that country grew from 118,000 to 143,000, figures that organizations of Bolivian residents in Argentina consider unrealistically low. It is likely that a large number are illegal residents and so not registered in official figures.
10. Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas, *Evaluación de la economía 2000* (UDAPE, 2001) <www.udape.gov.bo>.

TOWARDS AN ANDEAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM?

1. The hacienda system expanded especially during "growth periods" like the republican years of 1880-1920, when nation-building doctrines greatly accelerated the

- destruction of indigenous communities. See: Klein Herbert, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
2. Miguel Urioste, *Segunda reforma agraria, campesinas, tierra y educación popular* (La Paz: CEDLA, 1987).
3. Kevin Healy, *Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate, Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2001).
4. M. Pérez, *¿El último capítulo? Posibles impactos del ALCA en comunidades campesinas e indígenas de Bolivia* (La Paz: CEDLA, 2004); Prudencio B. Julio, *Integración regional y producción campesina, La urgencia de políticas de soberanía alimentaria* (Bolivia: CIOEC, 2004).
5. With alpacas outnumbering llamas five to one, Peru's Andean pastoral economy is almost the mirror opposite of Bolivia's.
6. In fact, rightist military regimes, tied to commercial cattle-ranching interests of eastern Bolivia, passed anti-camelid decrees prohibiting the marketing of llama meat, presumably to protect their beef markets in altiplano cities.
7. Clare Sammells and Lisa Markowitz, "Carne de llama: Alta viabilidad, baja visibilidad" in Didier Genin, Hans-Jachim Picht, Rodolfo Lizarazu and Tito Rodríguez (eds.), *Waira pampa un sistema pastoril camelidos-ovinos del altiplano árido boliviano* (La Paz: OSTRUM, CONPAC, and IBTA, 1995).
8. Ticona and Paredes were steeped in Andean studies and took advice from several North American anthropologists under the tutelage of Cornell anthropologist John Murra.
9. Healy, *Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate*.
10. There are also the more abundant sweet quinoa varieties that are of less commercial value and are consumed locally and in Bolivian cities.
11. Healy, *Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate*.
12. The Inter-American Foundation is currently subsidizing PRO-RURAL, a La Paz-based NGO, to work hand in glove with Irupana and grassroots producer associations to provide technical services to campesinos who join this new export program.
13. Alan Kolata, *Tiwanaku, the Portrait of an Andean Civilization* (Cambridge Blackwell, 1993).
14. Hurtado holds a PhD in rural sociology from the University of Berlin and worked for six years in grassroots development in Aymara communities with NGOs.
15. Calla was previously director of the Universidad de la Cordillera, has written many articles on indigenous social movements and has also produced extensive reports on indigenous development resources for European donors and the Inter-American Development Bank.
16. This initiative originated with the National Association of Ecological Producers of Bolivia, reaching Silvestre and the Senate through the effective coordinated lobbying of new indigenous political leaders and networks of small-scale producers.

THE BEAT GOES ON: THE U.S. WAR ON COCA

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1. *Encuesta de Opinión: Fuerzas armadas: Realidad y perspectiva institucional*, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Unidad de Análisis de Políticas de Defensa, 1998, p. 21. The broad-based study is based on the survey of a representative sample of approximately 10% of the members of the armed forces with even distribution in terms of branch membership, rank, age and posting.
2. Washington Office on Latin America/Andean Information Network, interview: Juan Ramón Quintana, November 18, 2002.
3. "Bolivia's Coca Crops," *The New York Times*, October 22, 2003.
4. "Bolivian Leader Seeks More Money to Quell Unrest," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 13, 2003.
5. Author interview, May 2004.
6. Kathryn Ledebur, "Coca and Conflict in the Chapare," Washington Office on Latin America, 2002. Ben Kohl and Linda Farthing, "The Price of Success: Bolivia's War against Drugs and the Poor," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, vol. 35 no.1, 2001, pp. 35-41. Human Rights Watch, "Bolivia under Pressure: Human Rights Violations and Coca Eradication," 1996. Bjorn Pettersson and Lesley MacKay, "Human Rights Violations Stemming from the 'War on Drugs' in Bolivia," Andean Information Network, 1993.
7. "In US Drug War, Ally Bolivia Loses Ground to Coca Farmers," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 13, 2003.
8. USAID, "Terms of Reference, Assessment of USAID-Bolivia Alternative